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ABSTRACT
The perennial debate over striking the right balance between judicial
independence and judicial accountability largely misses the mark. The tension
between these concepts arises only in the structural sense of the terms, i.e. the
conflict lies in the structural approaches traditionally taken to protect independence
and to enforce accountability. In actuality, our primary concern should be the
judge's own sense of independence and her internal sense of accountability. These
more subjective concepts-which may be termed "judicial courage" (for the judge
who is willing to act independently) and "judicial integrity" (for the judge who is
willing to hold herself accountable)-do not conflict with each other and therefore
need not be balanced. The structural protections (to insulate judges from outside
influence) and the accountability mechanisms (to police judicial misconduct) are still
important, but these structures should be considered in terms of their impact on
judges' exercise of courage and integrity. Given cultural and personal differences in
judges, however, the optimal structural prescription is highly variable. This Article
demonstrates how the proper balance depends on the judicial culture and the judges
already in the system, illustrating through a graphical analysis how to craft a system-
specific approach to such policy questions. The analysis also yields a caution that
any attempt to impose a one-size-fits-all solution for protecting independence while
promoting accountability may well do more harm than good.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2002, 1 addressed an assembled body of court presidents and
ministers of justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina, laying out for them some
recommendations on reforming the operation of their court systems. One of the
wizened judges-the president (i.e. chief judge) of a Court of Appeals in Bosnia's
Republika Srpska-stood up and excoriated me for presuming to tell them how to
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run their courts. He implied that I was attempting to "export" American-style justice
to a place where it did not fit and did not belong. He then, with a dramatic flourish,
stormed from the room. The old judge's assumptions were not well grounded-we
were not, in fact, prescribing an American-style system-but his point that American
approaches to judicial structure may not apply effectively in Bosnia was a sound
one.' In my later work to restructure the Bosnian judiciary, I was continually
reminded that what works in the United States or even Western Europe cannot be
presumed to suit the culture or society of the post-war Balkans.' My subsequent
judicial reform efforts in Bosnia-as well as in other countries and cultures-raised
fundamental and recurring questions about judicial independence and
accountability-how these goals might be most appropriately pursued and enshrined
in that society's court system.
Notwithstanding cultural differences, there are universal ideals to be pursued in
judicial systems, including principles of judicial independence and accountability.
The dissolution of the Supreme Court in Pakistan in November 2007, for example,
violated the widely shared ideal of judicial independence, prompting expressions of
outrage not only from the United States,4 but from the rest of the world, including the
legal profession within Pakistan.5
The legal literature explores these principles-judicial independence and
accountability-in broad and wide-ranging discussions, focusing very much on how
'Regrettably, some clumsy attempts to promote American concepts of justice
elsewhere in the world have marred international perceptions of Americans'
credibility, motives, and vision when it comes to international assistance. Those
perceptions led many to assume, because I am an American, that my sole interest
was in exporting American legal and judicial culture. The irony in this instance is
that I was not representing the United States in any way, but was, at that time, in
Bosnia as part of a consulting and reform team headed by a Norwegian judge and
funded entirely by the Norwegian government. In my experience, I never saw
anyone accuse the Norwegians of trying to export Scandinavian-style justice.
2America and Americans must be cautious about the hubris with which we
promote our own judicial system as a model for the rest of the "less-enlightened"
world. The impact we can have with such reform efforts-usually with the best
intentions to promote the rule of law in general-is limited by the level of credibility
we can muster. That credibility has certainly been damaged by the recent, ill-fated
efforts to bring American-style democracy and "freedom" to Iraq.
3See generally David Pimentel, Restructuring the Courts: In Search of Basic
Principles for the Judiciary of Post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L.
107 (2008) (exploring the criteria for establishing meaningful judicial reforms).
4See, e.g., Yale Law School News & Events: Legal Community Releases
Statement Regarding Rule of Law in Pakistan, http://www.law.yale.edu/
about/5866.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
5Every day, thousands of lawyers and members of the civil society striving for a
liberal and tolerant society in Pakistan demonstrate [protesting the dissolution of the
Supreme Court] on the streets. They are bludgeoned by the regime's brutal police
and paramilitary units. Yet they come out again the next day.
Aitzaz Ahsan, Pakistan's Tyranny Continues, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2007, at 10,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/23/opinion/23ahsan.html.
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they are or should be applied within the U.S. political system. A proper
understanding of such principles, however, requires us to look (1) beyond issues of
judicial structure, in the United States or anywhere, to consider the true goals of
judicial independence and accountability, and (2) beneath those same structural
issues to understand the true determinants of the individual judges' exercise of
independence and accountability.
As will be explained in this Article, a sharper focus on our ultimate goals for the
judiciary and on the individual judges' motivations-with specific reference to their
respective endowment of judicial courage and integrity-produces more responsive
policy prescriptions for judicial structure. Indeed, individual differences among
judges and among their respective communities or societies will yield different, even
inconsistent answers to the basic structural questions: we cannot look for a one-size-
fits-all solution. Productive analysis in this area must go beyond our culture-centric
expectations for judicial independence and accountability and, at the same time,
probe beneath such expectations to identify the determinants of independent and
accountable judicial behavior. This analysis can be depicted graphically and will, in
turn, suggest what balance of structural protections and accountability mechanisms
will best promote a strong and effective judiciary in that society.
II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: DEFINING AND REFINING THE CONCEPT
"Judicial independence" is widely viewed as a principle to be embraced and
promoted.6 That said, attempts to define "judicial independence" have met with
limited success, yielding formulations that are hopelessly vague.
One good example is the United Nations' attempt, reflected in the 1985 Basic
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, which sets forth the following
standard: "The judiciary shall decide matters before them . . .without any
restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences,
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason."7 There is no attempt to define
what an "improper influence" might be, or how it might be distinguished from a
"proper" one. Notwithstanding the obvious weaknesses in this treatment of the
issue, in August 2007, the American Bar Association House of Delegates voted
overwhelmingly to formally endorse this standard and definition.8 The uncritical
approach of the ABA may reflect the obviousness of the issue': the universal
6
PETER H. RUSSELL, Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY I (Peter H. Russell & David
M. O'Brien eds., 2001).
7U.N. Dept. Int'l Econ. Soc. Affs., U.N. Secretariat, Seventh United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Aug. 26 -
Sept. 6, 1985, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 59, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1 (1985), available at https://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
instree/i5bpij.htm.
8ABA House of Delegates: Select Committee Report 14 (Sept. 7, 2007),
available at www.abanet.org/leadership/2007/annual/docs/SelectCommittee
Report.doc.
9The Author was present at the ABA House of Delegates (in San Francisco on
August 13, 2007) when the resolution was taken up. No one spoke against it or
offered cautionary words or other misgivings.
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acceptance of the idea that judicial independence is a positive and worthy goal. No
one will oppose an endorsement of judicial independence when it is so obviously
good for the system.
The one caveat, sometimes offered, is that judicial independence should not come
at undue cost in terms of judicial accountability. If, for example, a judge is afforded
life tenure in an effort to insulate her from outside influences, and then she
demonstrates an invidious bias in her performance, the independence inherent in the
life tenure makes it difficult if not impossible to hold her accountable for her
unacceptable bias. Conversely, judicial accountability can undermine independence.
For example, if a robust system of judicial discipline and removal is put in place to
hold judges accountable for their biases, the judges' independence is inevitably
infringed, as the disciplinary regime can always be used to intimidate judges from
rendering unpopular decisions. This depicts the problem as one of balancing two
competing interests.
But this prosaic formulation of the issue runs the risk of obscuring the ultimate
goals and purposes of the judiciary.1" The fact that independence may need some
tempering is a tacit admission that there are other purposes or ideals to be served.
Any examination of the principles of independence and accountability in judicial
systems should keep in mind the ultimate "end" to be pursued, as well as the sources
and bases of judges' exercise of judicial independence. As further explained below,
discussion of the regimes for protecting independence and enforcing
accountability-and of the perceived tension between them-too often obscures the
more compelling issues underlying and served by these structural prescriptions.
A. Why Judicial Independence Is Important
Judicial independence is a bulwark of the Rule of Law." If the law is to be
enforced evenhandedly, the judges must be free to act independently in applying the
law and rendering judicial decisions. If ours is to be a "government of laws and not
men,"' 12 we must have a court system that respects law more than it respects the
power of any individual(s).
More pointedly, in a democratic society, the role of the judiciary may be to
protect the minority from the "tyranny of the majority."' 3  In that scenario, it
naturally follows that the democratic majority may well disapprove of a given
judicial intervention. And the elected political branches of government, reflecting
the views of the electorate, may be unhappy with the judiciary's imposition of
constitutional or other limits on the majority's ability to pursue its agenda
unchecked, i.e. its power to trample the rights of any unpopular minority. It is
inevitable that pressure will be brought to bear against the judiciary that is filling its
proper role of protecting that minority, and the judiciary must be independent enough
to withstand that pressure.
'See infra Part B.2.
"lSamuel L. Bufford, Defining the Rule of Law, 46 JUDGES' J. 16, 20 (2007).
2MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XXX.
13See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 138-42
(1835).
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But "judicial independence" connotes more than insularity from the political
process and political pressure. Judges may also be subject to threats and pressure
from litigants, including society's criminal element. Organized crime has,
historically, been quick to recognize the value of having judges "on their side" and
has tapped its considerable expertise in the field of extortion and bribery to influence
judges in corrupt ways. 4
As a rallying cry for this cause, however, the term "judicial independence" does
not always strike the desired chord. While that phrase resonates within the legal
community as something desirable-lawyers certainly do not want judges subject to
political or other corrupting influence or beholden to outside causes or interests-it
may seem less desirable in other circles for two reasons.
First, as already noted, those in power may not be at all happy that judges can
exercise independence to subvert their will, which they will characterize as the will
of the majority.'5 For that reason, it is the marginalized minority, unable to
implement its agenda through the political process, who will champion an
"independent" judiciary as its best hope to advance its interests. The majority,
aggrieved by judicial decisions that subvert their agenda, will brand the independent
judges as "activist judges" and condemn them.'6
14See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Keynote Address: Thorny Issues and Slippery
Slopes: Perspectives on Judicial Independence, 64 Onlo ST. L.J. 3, 10 (2003)
(discussing how threats of physical harm impair judicial independence); see also,
generally, CHARLES R. ASHMAN, THE FINEST JUDGES MONEY CAN Buy, AND OTHER
FORMS OF JUDICIAL POLLUTION (1973) (documenting the cases of dozens of corrupt
judges); ROBERT COOLEY, WHEN CORRUPTION WAS KING: How I HELPED THE MOB
RULE CHICAGO, THEN BROUGHT THE OUTFIT DOWN (2004) (recounting the
historical perspective of a mob attorney turned state's evidence).
15See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat Discussing the Plan for
Reorganization of the Judiciary (Mar. 9, 1937), available at
http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/030937 ("Last Thursday I described the American
form of Government as a three horse team provided by the Constitution to the
American people so that their field might be plowed. The three horses are, of course,
the three branches of government-the Congress, the Executive and the Courts.
Two of the horses are pulling in unison today; the third is not. Those who have
intimated that the President of the United States is trying to drive that team,
overlook the simple fact that the President, as Chief Executive, is himself one of the
three horses. It is the American people themselves who are in the driver's seat. It is
the American people themselves who want the furrow plowed. It is the American
people themselves who expect the third horse to pull in unison with the other two.").
See also Frances Kahn Zemans, Pound Revisited, 48 S. TEx. L. REv. 1063, 1066
(2007) (regarding "President Roosevelt's court-packing plan .... Members of the
court were attacked as activist judges who were imposing their will over the
legislative and executive branches of government"); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST
DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA 5 (2006) ("Critics of
judicial activism frequently charge that whenever a court strikes down a law, it
effectively thwarts the will of the majority that passed that law.").
16See generally the criticism of judges involved in the Terry Schiavo cases,
described in Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the
Realm of Political Rhetoric, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 911, 912-13 (2006).
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Second, to the general public at least, and even to legislators at times, the words
"judicial independence" may smack of the judges' self-interest-shoring up judges'
power or enhancing their comfort by insulating them from any consequences for
their actions. For those who already view judges as over-privileged and too
powerful, such "judicial independence" would be at best a low priority, and more
likely a problem in need of a remedy. 7 Acknowledging the potential for this
misperception, some who actively promote the independence of the judiciary have
begun using different terminology, insisting that they are working toward a judiciary
that is impartial or fair, rather than one that is independent. 8
B. Judicial Independence as a Means to an End
The shift in terminology is not a matter of mere semantics. Even the most ardent
champions of judicial independence acknowledge that it is only a means to an end. 9
While the "means to and end" formulation is largely uncontroversial, it is not always
clear what the "end" should be. Some focus on an independence that inspires public
confidence and trust in the judiciary.2" Some have embraced the phrase "fair and
impartial courts," which appears to be closer to the mark,2 ' but some caution is
'7 See, e.g., Kelly J. Varsho, Comment, In the Global Market for Justice: Who Is
Paying the Highest Price for Judicial Independence?, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 445, 452
(2007) ("[A]n independent judiciary is accountable to no one. People argue that
there can be too much judicial independence; since judges are government officials
who exercise plenary power, they should be accountable to the public.").
18See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 14, at 3 (recognizing "fair[ness]" and
"impartial[ity]" as ideals sought as the ends of judicial independence and
accountability); ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence,
http://www.abanet.org/judind/aboutus/home.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2008);
University of Denver: Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System,
http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/mission.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2008); The
Justice at Stake Campaign: Why Judicial Independence Matters,
http://www.faircourts.org/contentViewer.asp?breadCrumb=2 (last visited Dec. 18,
2008).
19Compare Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by "Judicial
Independence"?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 324-30 (proposing that the end varies as the
goals of politics determine what is desired in a court), with Abrahamson, supra note
14, at 4 (describing the end as due process, "a fair trial according to the law."). Both
sources agree, however, that judicial independence is a means to one of these ends,
and not an end in itself.
20As former Chief Judge J. Clifford Wallace put it, "The people must desire
judicial independence because of the benefits that will enure to them, so reforms
designed to secure such independence must be implemented with an eye to
improving the quality and quantity of justice to a country's citizens." J. Clifford
Wallace, An Essay on Independence of the Judiciary: Independence from What and
Why, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 241, 247 (2001).
2
1"Impartial" is a good word because it suggests freedom from corrupting
influences, where one can get a fair trial. Accordingly, this phrasing may be as good
as any. In the end, we assume that "fair and impartial courts" will apply the law
responsibly, consistent with principles of justice and equity, and without regard for
the popularity of the decision with any group or the public at large. Professor Dinh
has made a particularly elegant statement on achieving impartiality, characterizing it
CLEVELAND STATE LA W RE VIE W
warranted here as well, specifically with regard to the word "fair."2 A judge should
be expected to follow and apply the law, even though the law may sometimes
generate outcomes the public views as "unfair"; and if the law prescribes such
results, it is up to the legislature to amend the law, rather than up to the judge to
disregard it, substituting her own sense of fairness for it.23 Bearing in mind these
cautions, and the need for further attention to the issue, for purposes of this Article it
is sufficient to characterize the end as a judicial system that affords due process to
all parties, impartially and according to law.24
But this formulation is unlikely to resolve the ongoing debate. There is no
universal consensus, of course, on "due process": what it is or what characterization
of it should be enshrined as an inviolable principle of justice. Nonetheless, this
formulation is sufficient for and important to the analysis that follows, however,
because it suggests the judges' obligation to adhere to principles of law. Professor
Charles Geyh has pointedly observed that judges will not and cannot realistically
apply principles of law in a mechanistic way, without reference to the judges' own
personal values. They can and must be expected to apply the law in ways that serve
each judge's own sense of what the law should be "in light of their [own] ideological
attitudes."25 It is certainly unrealistic, even if it were desirable, to expect judges to
behave as automatons, applying externally dictated legal principles, uninformed by
the judge's own values, perspective, and conceptions ofjustice.
On the other hand, it is similarly unrealistic and repugnantly cynical to assume
that judges will always serve only their own ideological instincts in utter disregard of
as "free[ing] judges to decide cases based on what the law actually requires, and on
nothing else." Viet D. Dinh, Threats to Judicial Independence, Real and Imagined,
95 GEO. L.J. 929, 931 (2007).
22As Dr. Frances Zemans has observed,
It may also be necessary to avoid terms such as "fair" and "good" unless tempered by
reference to restrictions imposed by the written law. The impression that the judge
relies on fairness as the standard against which to measure decisions can have
dangerous implications that the judge is free to follow her conscience despite the law.
Sometimes the law itself is unfair or unwise, but lacking a constitutional infirmity the
judge is bound by it. And unless there is a legal basis, the judge cannot right every
wrong. In addition, judges do not set their own agendas. Thus, they are dependent on
others to bring claims before them. While these are quite obvious to judges and
lawyers, they may not be so obvious to those who need to be convinced that judicial
independence is to be valued and protected.
Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 644, 646-47 (1999).
23Dr. Zemans goes on to observe: "In discussions of judicial independence,
judges are frequently referred to as symbols of our justice system .... For many,
dissatisfactions with the justice system-including those relating to police,
prosecutors, private attorneys and the law itself-are not the judge's responsibility
or usually within the judge's power to correct." Id
24This formulation is inspired by that used by Abrahamson, supra note 14, at 4.
25Charles Gardner Geyh, Straddling the Fence Between Truth and Pretence: The
Role of Law and Preference in Judicial Decision-Making and the Future of Judicial
Independence (2008) (on file with the author) (quoting JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITUDINAL MODEL 73 (1993)).
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existing law.26 As a matter of principle, we do expect judges to respect and apply
legislative enactments, whether they agree with them or not. We demand sufficient
character of our judges to withstand the temptation to pursue personal agendas, and
to responsibly apply established legal principles, even as they let their own legal
philosophy and ideological values influence such application.
Adherence to law in judicial decision-making, therefore, is a principle of ethics.
The judge's ethical foundation must be strong enough to withstand the natural
inclination to pursue self-interest or to yield to outside pressures. The formulation of
the desired "end," therefore, must emphasize the obligation to adhere to the law, to
resist the temptation to deviate therefrom. With that in mind, the formulation set
forth above-a judicial system that affords due process to all parties, impartially
and according to law-is sufficient to the purpose.
C. Alternative Characterizations for Judicial Independence
While it certainly helps to understand the ultimate purpose of judicial
independence, that does not settle persistent uncertainties about what the phrase
means.27  Judicial independence is an appealing concept-indeed it has been
recognized as a universal human rightN--but the attempts to define it often generate
formulations that are vague and of limited value. 9 Some of the literature seems to
focus on weakness in the courts, where judges bend to pressure, using essentially
anecdotal analysis demonstrating what judicial independence is not.3" Just as often,
the literature condemns those outside the judiciary for the pressure and public
26Id"
27Similar observations have been made about concepts such as "separation of
church and state," which on a superficial level seem to resonate, but which are
devilishly difficult to define with any degree of precision. See, e.g., John C.
Knechtle, If We Don't Know What It Is, How Do We Know if It's Established?, 41
BRANDEIS L.J. 521, 528 (2003) (noting that the strict separationists' high and
impregnable wall of religion is impossible to achieve under the Court's definition
which recognizes the "diversity of practices and beliefs in the United States").
28Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 10, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (December 12, 1948); see International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, art. 14(1), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1976).
29See supra Part B, nn.7-9 and accompanying text.
3 0See, e.g., Carl E. Stewart, Contemporary Challenges to Judicial Independence,
43 Loy. L. Rev. 293, 298-300 (1997) (noting that in response to an immediate
congressional and media denouncement of his holding in Bayless, Judge Baer
reversed his holding). United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y 1996),
vacated on reconsideration, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aft'd, 201 F.3d 116
(2d Cir. 2000) (finding no abuse of discretion by Judge Baer in reconsidering his
initial ruling to suppress evidence of flight from police in a drug case because it
constituted the suspect's natural reaction to police given the history of police abuse
toward African Americans), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1061 (2000).
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criticism they apply, implying that such influences violate judicial independence, or
that true judicial independence requires the absence of such pressures or criticism.3
For purposes of this discussion, it will be helpful to be more precise in our
definitions, distinguishing between what I will call "objective" or "structural"
judicial independence and "subjective" or "personal" judicial independence. These
are explained more fully below.32
1. Objective or "Structural" Judicial Independence
One of the more popular conceptions of judicial independence defines it with
reference to structural protections afforded the judges, measuring their judicial
independence in terms of the structures that insulate judges from retribution for
unpopular decisions they may render.33 The types of protections that may exist
include (1) guarantees of long- or life-tenure,34 (2) guarantees against salary cuts,35
and (3) a disciplinary regime that is largely removed from the other branches of
government.36 No less important is (4) the provision of adequate security protection
31Geyh, supra note 16, at 915 ("Critics of the critics, however, argue that court-
bashers are simply seeking to intimidate judges into contorting the law to reach
outcomes the critics favor.").
32This distinction tracks closely a distinction in types of judicial independence
made by Professor Peter Russell:
In political science literature, judicial independence has been used to refer to two
concepts. One of these is the autonomy of judges--collectively and individually-
from other individuals and institutions.... Judicial independence is also used to refer
to judicial behavior that is considered indicative of judges enjoying a high measure of
autonomy ....
RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 6.
33For an example, consider the court system of Romania, where until recently all
judges were under, and reported to, the Minister of Justice, who, in turn, is a very
political appointee of the president. The European Union concluded that the
judiciary there failed to meet the EU's minimum standards of judicial independence,
based on the objectively observable fact that judges were vulnerable to political
consequences for their decisions and, therefore, vulnerable to political pressure. In
response, the 2003 Constitution of Romania, created a Council of the Magistracy in
order to comply with the European Union's requirements for the judicial
independence of its member nations. ABA: Central European and Eurasian Law
Initiative, http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/romania/legalinfo.html (last visited
Jan. 30, 2008).
34See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
351d.
361f issues of judicial misconduct and discipline are handled within the judiciary,
by other judges who also enjoy the tenure and income protections already cited, the
whole process enjoys some insulation fiom political forces. J. Clifford Wallace,
Resolving Judicial Corruption While Preserving Judicial Independence:
Comparative Perspectives, 28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 341, 345 (1998) (Judge Wallace
"suggest[s] that to preserve judicial independence, these investigations should be left
primarily to the judicial branch"). Otherwise this "judicial accountability system"
may be misused by political players to intimidate judges or otherwise influence
judges in their decisions.
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for judges and their families, lest they be intimidated by criminal threats.37 Judicial
independence includes independence from all outside influences, not just political
ones.
These protections are designed to insulate judges from outside pressures in their
individual decision-making, in the judgments they render. This type of judicial
independence is sometimes characterized, therefore, as "decisional independence.""
The term "judicial independence" can also be characterized more broadly to refer
to the independence of the judicial branch as a whole-i.e. separation of powers-
rather than to the independence of an individual judge in decision-making in her own
cases. This concept has been distinguished from decisional independence with the
label "institutional independence."39 It is important to keep the distinction in mind,
lest principles of judicial macro- (or institutional) independence be inadvertently
conflated with those of judicial micro- (or decisional) independence. In the "macro"
analysis, for example, the legislative branch is certainly capable of asserting pressure
on the judicial branch, if it wishes to, because it controls the judiciary's budget
allocation.4 ° Beyond budgets, the judiciary may stand in need of other forms of
legislative relief, such as overdue judicial improvements, the creation of new
judgeships to address short-staffing and swelling caseloads, and the filling of vacant
judgeships (at least in the federal system where the legislature must confirm judicial
appointments). The third branch is, of course, beholden to the legislature-as well
as to the executive branch's veto authority-for these things. Accordingly, it is easy
for these other branches to make life difficult for the judiciary as a whole if they are
unhappy with recent judicial decisions.
That pressure is a blunt instrument for influencing individual judges, however,
and is, therefore, less of a threat to judges' decisional independence. Indeed, it can
be felt by individual judges only because they-among many-suffer directly the
consequences of budgetary or other legislative measures, or because they may feel
pressure from their judicial colleagues who are suffering a much larger cumulative
impact of the other branches' retaliatory measures.4'
37it is important to remember that judicial independence may be compromised
not just by meddling of other branches of government, or by the whims of electoral
majorities, but also by threats and influence from the criminal element or other
parties with interests pending before the court. Abrahamson, supra note 14, at 10
(discussing how threats of physical harm impair judicial independence).
38Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 369, 386 (2006) ("[1]t is common to distinguish decisional
independence from institutional and other components of judicial independence.").
391d. See also Ronald M. George, Challenges Facing an Independent Judiciary,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1345 (2005) (discussing observable steps taken by the state of
California to shore up this institutional independence of the courts).
4°See Wallace, supra note 20, at 246 ("The legislature's control over the
provision of financial resources to the judiciary prevents the judiciary from being
completely independent from the rest of the government.").
4'The independence of individual judges from their colleagues within the
judicial branch is a subject that has yet to be explored, at least as it applies within the
United States. For a compelling discussion of this issue in the Japanese court
system, see David M. O'Brien & Yasuo Ohkoshi, Stifling Judicial Independence
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2. Subjective or "Personal" Judicial Independence
"Structural independence," as explained above, however, does not directly
address the decision-making behavior of judges. The fact that a judge may face
objectively observable pressures or be vulnerable to threats of removal or discipline
in the exercise of her or his judicial function, does not itself establish that the judge is
not acting independently. If the judge does not bow to the pressure-is not, in fact,
influenced by it-how are the principles of judicial independence compromised?42
While we think judges should be free from such pressures and criticisms as a matter
of policy, or that perhaps it is unfair of us to expect them to be independent in the
face of such pressures, the independence of the judge is not compromised until and
unless she succumbs to them.43 In other words, as a matter of definition, a judge
demonstrates subjective or "personal" independence," if she or he is not actually
influenced by these outside pressures the structure allows, quite regardless of their
number or intensity."
from Within, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY 37, 37 (Peter H.
Russell and David M. O'Brien eds., 2001).
42The evils of "pressure" on judges are not limited to the risk that judges may
succumb to the pressure, of course. The fact that the pressure exists may well lead
to problems of perception. A judge who is subjected to pressure from the Executive
Branch to rule a certain way, and who does rule that way, may well be perceived to
have bowed to the pressure. Her decision may not command the respect it deserves,
and she may be perceived as a "tool" even if the decision is made entirely
independently of the pressures asserted. While this perception is itself a serious
problem, it does not speak to the issue of judicial independence per se, but rather to
the collateral issue of "perception." See the discussion of the controversial ruling of
Judge Harold Baer infra Part E. 1. See also Stewart, supra note 30.
43Professors Burbank and Geyh suggest that "judicial accountability" may be a
key element of judicial independence, intimating that accountability requires the
judge's own exercise of moral restraint. See Burbank, supra note 19, at 325
("[J]udicial independence and judicial accountability 'are different sides of the same
coin.' An accountable judiciary without any independence is weak and feeble. An
independent judiciary without any accountability is dangerous."); see also Geyh,
supra note 16, at 915 (affirming Professor Burbank's assertion that judicial
independence and judicial accountability are 'two sides of the same coin,' giving
further explanations of the less-understood 'tails' side, and emphasizing judges'
intent for determining appropriate measures of accountability). This argument is
analogous to the "subjective" analysis I propose here, that judges can and should do
the (or "a") right thing, whatever pressures may exist to do otherwise. They suggest
that the judges must keep their noses clean in this way if they want to maintain the
degree of objective structural protections they now enjoy. Any abuse of that
independence to act unethically will surely prompt the other branches of government
to act to curtail the structural protections presently in place.
44Professor Russell describes such judges, at least hypothetically:
We can all imagine judges, and perhaps some of us can even point to a few, who,
despite lacking the main ingredients of judicial independence in the first sense [i.e.
insulation from the influence of outside forces, particularly the other branches of
government], nevertheless were brave enough to defy those who could and would
sanction them for their decision making and to assert judicial independence in the
second sense [i.e the assertion of independence in the judge's behavior].
RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 6.
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The concept was aptly described, in rather informal terms by Lady Brenda M.
Hale, Senior Law Lord, United Kingdom, who responded recently to a concern that
the highest court in the United Kingdom is actually and literally part of the House of
Lords, a legislative body. While this court lacks separation of powers, and therefore
suffers seriously deficient structural independence, the court and the judges (or Law
Lords) on it are nonetheless independent in operation: "People go on the way they go
on, and it's what people do, rather than the institutions that matter. We are
independent as members of the House of Lords. We do our job independently of the
Parliamentarians, albeit in the same building."45
This subjective or personal judicial independence, reflecting the judge's
subjective motivations and actions, is hard to analyze from a distance, as it is neither
observable nor measurable with any degree of directness. It is perhaps for this
reason this it is so often neglected in the literature. On the other hand, to the extent
we care about the independence judges actually exercise, the subjective approach is
vital.
Another way to look at this is that when we assess the level of judicial
independence in a judicial system objectively, in terms of the structural protections
provided to judges, we are only measuring a surrogate. We may, perhaps, assume a
high correlation between the protections provided to judges from outside pressure
and their ability to resist such pressure. But focusing too much on the surrogate may
obscure other compelling issues relating to the subjective independence of the judge
or the judiciary overall. Developing a sound public policy to promote and preserve
the judges' true or personal independence requires that we start with a subjective
analysis, and consider its nuances, rather than assume them away in our pursuit of
appropriate structural protections.
III. JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: DEFINING AND REFINING THE CONCEPT
Judicial accountability is another term that is difficult to pin down, although there
are a few basic principles about which everyone can agree. First, we all want judges
who will follow the law, respecting and applying proper legislative enactments,
setting aside any personal legislative agenda. One might be tempted to oversimplify
and say that we want judges to "do the right thing,"46 whatever that may be, although
that characterization is problematic in the extreme, because there is no consensus on
what the "right thing" might be in any particular case, and because the phrase
misleadingly implies that there is only one "right thing" to do. Professors Ferejohn
and Kramer explain:
No one really believes that law is wholly indeterminate, but virtually everyone
recognizes that modem jurisprudential tools create a range of legitimate choices in
almost any given case. And even those who believe in objectively "right" answers
appreciate that the process by which these answers are generated hinges on
45Discussion at Georgetown Law Center's Hart Auditorium: Webcast - Justice
Ginsburg and Baroness Hale: The British and United States Legal Systems (Jan. 24,
2008), https:// www.law.georgetown.edu/webcast/eventDetail.cfm?eventlD=473.
46Cf Do THE RIGHT THING (40 Acres & a Mule Filmworks 1989) (in which
filmmaker Spike Lee explores the difficulty in determining what is "the right thing"
in a given situation).
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arguments and judgments of a kind about which reasonable people can (and will)
subjectively disagree.47
As discussed above, it is an essential element of judicial decision-making that the
judges' own perspective and values will play a significant role in the decision, even
as the judge adheres appropriately to the constraints of the law she is applying. This
clearly admits the possibility, even the inevitability, of a range of "right things" in
any particular scenario."
At the same time, while faithful adherence to law admits a range of options to the
ethical and accountable judge, wholesale disregard of the law is not within the range
of ethical and accountable judicial behavior. Thus, while we will never find a
consensus on what the right thing is, it may be easier to identify or envision
scenarios of abuse of judicial authority that "cross the line." So while it is
problematic to say that a judge should "do the right thing," it may be less so to assert
that a judge should "not do the wrong thing."
The second issue for consensus-and a far easier one to assert-is that the judge
striving to do "a" (if not "the") right thing should do it for the right reason. Biases,
outside pressures, conflicts of interest, and other self-dealing or self-interested
behaviors are all anathema to the proper and ethical exercise of judicial powers.
Here the focus is not on the decision itself being wrong-indeed, the judge's brother-
in-law may well have deserved to win the case under the law anyway-but with the
judges' improper reasons for rendering that decision.49 These expectations we have
ofjudges are tied up in the concept of accountability.
While the word "accountable" often implies the existence of an external authority
to whom one is accountable, it is clear that the word has a more general definition as
well, synonymous with "responsibility."5 In this latter sense, the judge may be
deemed accountable to higher principles-higher than her own self interest,
anyway--or to herself.5' Some may insist that accountability to "principles" or to
oneself (i.e. "holding oneself accountable"), rather than to an authority with the
47John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 973 (2002).
48The multiplicity of appropriate outcomes in any judicial decision is evidenced
by the prevalence of dissenting votes in appellate courts. It would be ridiculous and
unfair to suggest that every split decision or reversal on appeal means at least one
judge was abusing her independence and failed to meet minimum standards of
judicial accountability.
49Geyh, supra note 16, at 914-15 (emphasizing judges' intent when determining
appropriate measures of accountability).
5 The word "responsible" appears as a synonym for "accountable" in most
dictionaries, for example. Random House Unabridged Dictionary of the English
Language (1987); American Heritage Dictionary, 4th ed. (2000), available at
http://bartleby.com/61/42/A0044200.html (last visited March 14, 2008).
5 The writings of Professors Geyh and Burbank recognize the correlation
between judicial behavior and accountability in this way. See supra text
accompanying note 43. But accountability can also refer to answerability,
presumably to some person or body of authority; this meaning is characterized as
"objective or structural accountability" in this Article. See infra text accompanying
note 62.
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power of punishment or correction is not accountability at all. Nonetheless, this
internal sense of responsibility, this integrity, as explained below, is type of
accountability that is most important for purposes of pursuing our ultimate goals for
the judiciary.
A. Why Judicial Accountability Is Important
Judicial accountability, like judicial independence, is also a bulwark of the Rule
of Law.52 Public confidence in the courts is inspired not so much by independence
as by accountability: if the public perceives the court to be making principled
decisions based on the law, and without corrupt motive or influence, they will trust
the judiciary and abide by its decisions.53 A judge may be deemed "accountable," by
just about any definition, if she adheres to the normative ethical and legal principles
of her culture and society.
It is important to note here that concepts of ethics may be highly dependent on
culture, and may differ widely from one society to another.54 Each society is entitled
to demand of its judges a strict adherence to the prevailing moral code as defined in
that community. While the basic principles are likely to be shared across cultural
lines, it is easy to imagine scenarios in which the relative weight given to one moral
imperative over another may not be shared in a contrasting cultural milieu. For
example, in one culture, women may be recognized as a vulnerable group, deserving
of special protections and solicitude afforded by judges; in other cultures, the
principle of equal protection may trump this, and any special deference given to the
needs of women would be considered an unethical bias.
In the United States, much of the recent controversy over judicial accountability
has derived from the notion that a court's decisions should reflect the preferences of
the majority. Judges whose decisions are perceived as contrary to prevailing public
opinion are routinely condemned as "judicial activists," and demands are made that
they be more "accountable" to the public. This Article does not squarely address that
issue, other than to suggest that judges, in their role to protect the rights of unpopular
minorities, should not be subjected to or accountable to majoritarian will.55 As
discussed above, judges must adhere to the law and should be accountable to the
highest principles of law and justice.
The degree to which judges should (1) defer to the legislature or (2) stand up to
the legislature (in defense of basic principles of constitutional justice) is a matter of
52See Bufford, supra note 11, at 21 ("The rule of law further requires that no
public official be above the law or exempt from its requirements. While public
officials enjoy a measure of immunity while working in their official capacities, the
rule of law requires that they nonetheless be subject to the same laws as every other
individual outside the sphere of their official duties.").
53Wallace, supra note 20, at 246 ("When the judiciary is either corrupt or subject
to influence or intimidation by corrupt officials, groups, or individuals, the citizens
will not trust it, and they will lack confidence that resort to judicial process will
achieve a just resolution of their conflicts.").
54See Burbank, supra note 19, at 331 (providing support for the idea that
"identifying and understanding the complex ... norms and understandings... may
have more practical importance... than any formal rules.").
55See discussion supra Part B.1 and note 13.
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differing views or even ideology, but for purposes of this Article, we need not
quibble over such differences. Judicial selection mechanisms, for the most part, take
into account the judicial candidate's judicial philosophy. 6 And quite regardless of
where a judge appears on the ideological spectrum, a judge should conform her
decisions to some principled analysis. Even though she will certainly bring her own
values to the table, accountability requires that she premise her decisions upon a
dedication to the rule of law, not upon self-interest, upon a personal agenda, or upon
partiality for an interested party.
B. Alternative Characterizations of Judicial Accountability
Even more than "judicial independence," a common understanding of what we
mean by "judicial accountability," as already discussed, is elusive. As already noted,
there is a vital distinction between (1) the judge who is accountable to the law, to
higher principles ofjustice, and to her own sense of ethical responsibility, and (2) the
judge who is deemed "accountable" only to the extent that she is held accountable by
some external force with powers of discipline or retribution. I am already taking
some liberties in using the word "accountability" in this first sense. Accordingly, for
purposes of this discussion, it will be helpful to be more precise in our definitions,
distinguishing between what I will call "objective" or "structural" judicial
accountability and "subjective" or "personal" judicial accountability. These are
explained more fully below.
1. Objective or "Structural" Judicial Accountability
This first of these concepts shows up in most of the literature discussing judicial
accountability. Judges cannot be allowed to run amok, and must be held accountable
for their own lapses of ethics or other abuses of judicial authority. A disciplinary
regime must be in place to police judicial misconduct, and those enforcement
mechanisms will be observable, both on paper and-unless it is an entirely
confidential process-in operation. 7  When the public is outraged by "judicial
activists" they will call for "more accountability" in terms of enhanced power to rein
in the perceived miscreant judges. Accordingly, the powers of the disciplinary
authority can be adjusted (strengthened or relaxed) to reflect public policy goals. In
any case, this institutional check on judicial abuses can be characterized as objective
or "structural" accountability.
2. Subjective or "Personal" Judicial Accountability
However, the subjective or personal accountability of the judge comes from
within; one's internal moral compass is not a function of that person's vulnerability
56In the federal system, the President appoints, and the Senate confirms, all
Article III judges-a process well calculated to ensure that the judges appointed are
not out-of-step with prevailing norms on such exercises of judicial power. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
570f course, the appellate courts will also serve a role in enforcing
accountability, at least as to the merits of the cases appealed. The appellate courts
have never been characterized as a threat to the independence of lower courts
however.
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to discipline or other retribution for misdeeds.58 We should expect-or at the very
least hope-that judges will adhere to the law and to higher principles of justice and
ethics not merely because they fear detection and punishment under a disciplinary
regime, but because it is the right thing to do. 9 If we expect this level of integrity
from anyone, we should certainly expect it of our judges.6"
This personal accountability-the internal, professional integrity of the judge-
however, is not something that is objectively observable, and it is therefore difficult
to analyze.6 It is not surprising, therefore, that the scholarly discussion tends to
focus on objective or structural accountability,62 the nature and power of the system
of judicial discipline, using that as a surrogate for, if not an outright definition of,
judicial accountability.63
58See Wallace, supra note 36, at 345 ("In the end, judicial independence can be
preserved only if judges exert the moral leadership and strength of character
required to ensure judicial accountability. Benjamin Franklin's statement applies
equally to a judiciary: 'Only a virtuous people are capable of freedom. As a nation
becomes corrupt and vicious, they have more need of masters."').
59Cf supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing problems with
defining what is "the right thing").
60Elected officials are always subject to the will of the electorate and are bound
in a very practical sense to follow the majority's view on matters of policy. Their
re-election depends on it. Judges are often insulated from public sentiment-we
have to be able to trust their ethical sense, their commitment to doing the right thing,
much more than we do for our elected officials. See Geyh, supra note 16, at 925.
[H]onest mistakes may be corrected by fellow judges via the judicial process and,
absent evidence of incompetence, offending judges should be insulated from discipline
or other punishment. As Tennessee Justice Adolpho Birch put it, "Judicial
independence is the judge's right to do the right thing or, believing it to be the right
thing, to do the wrong thing."
Id.
6 iCf Zemans, supra note 22, at 645, which emphasizes how the public can
observe disciplinary regimes and objective accountability:
Some jurisdictions have programs designed to inform citizens about the operation and
accessibility of judicial discipline. All of these programs offer means by which courts
and judges are held accountable. Whether they result in enhanced legitimacy of the
courts and thus justification for judicial independence depends on what the public
learns.
Id. (citations omitted). Subjective accountability is almost entirely unobservable and
unmeasurable.
62An interesting exception here is Professor Dinh, who has contrasted judicial
independence with judicial "restraint," suggesting that judges must restrain
themselves from an otherwise natural inclination to overreach in their decisions,
exceed their judicial powers, or engage in policy making from the bench. Dinh,
supra note 21. The term "restraint" presupposes a judicial agenda, however, it is
inconsistent with the judge's proper role and must therefore be restrained. The term
"integrity" better captures the essence of a judge's motivation, i.e. to do what the
law requires or what is right.
63Geyh provides a tripartite taxonomy of accountability, dividing the discussion
into three forms of accountability: (1) institutional accountability, (2) behavioral
accountability, and (3) decisional accountability. In so doing, he seeks to establish
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IV. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE V. JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: WHERE IS THE
CONFLICT?
At this point, we can revisit the conventional wisdom that there is inherent
tension between the principles of judicial independence and judicial accountability.
The typical analysis, summarized above, goes as follows: If we institute structural
protections for judges, enabling them to follow the law and render unpopular but just
decisions without fear of political (or other) retribution, we are simultaneously
freeing them to disregard the law and to render corrupt decisions without fear of
retribution.' At the same time, any disciplinary regime designed to punish judges
for misconduct inevitably subjects judges to the influence of the disciplinary
authority, impairing their independence. This has led some to characterize the issue
as a direct trade-off.65 If we hold judges accountable for their bad behavior, that does
inherent violence to their independence; and if we shore up their independence, we
limit the system's ability to police judges' misconduct, and the judges are rendered
"unaccountable. 66
It should be obvious at this point, however, that the entire debate-the whole
concept that independence and accountability come only at each other's expense-is
true only for these principles in their objective or structural sense. The disciplinary
regime will always be a threat to structural judicial independence, i.e. to those
structural protections that might otherwise protect judges from outside influence.
Whoever has the power to discipline judges may, at some point, misuse that power in
an effort to exert improper influence on judges. At the same time, if we strengthen
structural independence, insulating judges from the reach of their critics, we
inherently weaken any system for enforcing judicial accountability.
However, the conflict or trade-off evaporates when we look at personal
independence and personal accountability, looking beyond and beneath the
conventional structural approaches toward safeguarding the two principles, and
considering the principles in their subjective sense. There is nothing inherently
which modes of punishment are appropriate for each form. Geyh, supra note 16, at
917.
64Id. at 916 ("[J]udges who are so independent that they can disregard the law
altogether without fear of reprisal likewise undermine the rule of law values that
judicial independence is supposed to further.").
651n 2006, Case Western Reserve Law Review conducted a symposium,
referenced frequently in this Article, entitled "Judicial Independence and Judicial
Accountability: Searching for the Right Balance." The title of the symposium alone
betrays the nearly axiomatic understanding that these two principles are in
fundamental conflict and that a balance must be struck between them. Symposium,
Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability: Searching for the Right
Balance, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 899-1118 (2006).
66Professor Burbank suggests that there is no inherent conflict here, but that is
only because he uses judicial accountability in a more subjective sense, consistent
with that advanced more fully in this Article. See the discussion of "judicial
integrity" at supra Part C.2.ii and and infra Part E.2; Stephen B. Burbank, The
Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 315, 339 (1999)
(observing that judicial independence and judicial accountability are "different sides
of the same coin"); see also Burbank, supra note 19, at 330-32.
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contradictory between a judge's subjective or personal independence (her refusal to
be influenced by outside pressures, however great or small) and her subjective or
personal accountability (her commitment to adhering to the law and higher principles
of justice). Quite the contrary, these things are fully complementary. A judge may
well find the courage to act independently in the face of outside pressures precisely
because the judge has such a strong ethical commitment. Conversely, the judge may
be able to preserve and maintain her personal accountability only by exercising the
personal independence to resist outside pressures. Any capitulation to such
pressures constitutes a compromise of both principles-the compromised judge has
demonstrated weakness in terms of personal independence, and a fully corresponding
weakness in personal accountability.
So true independence and true accountability can be fully consistent and mutually
reinforcing. It is only the clumsy mechanisms we adopt to safeguard that
independence-by minimizing the negative consequences a judge may face by
standing up to outside pressures-which conflict, in turn, with the even clumsier
discipline mechanisms we adopt for enforcing accountability. The core principles
are in harmony; it is the objectively observable surrogates that conflict.67
This popular conception that judicial independence and judicial accountability
conflict, therefore, presents an oversimplification of the factors truly at play.
Because structural protections for judges are not the source or determinant of a
judge's personal independence, the relative strength or weakness of those protections
is not a direct measure of the degree of true judicial independence that exists in a
judicial system. At the same time, disciplinary mechanisms, or other threats to a
judge's career or tenure that may exist as a sanction for bad behavior, are not the
source of the judge's personal accountability and can never serve as a meaningful
measure of the same.
V. FOCUSING ON MORE RELEVANT FACTORS: DEFINING NEW TERMS
Ultimately, in terms of our desired "end"-"a judicial system that affords due
process to all parties, impartially and according to law" 6 -the personal
independence of the individual judges is far more important than the structural
independence reflected in the system. We promote structural independence only
because we hope and expect that it will, in turn, promote personal independence.
Similarly, in terms of achieving our highest aspirations for our court system, the
personal accountability of judges is far more compelling than the effectiveness of
any disciplinary regime. The structural accountability in the system is designed to
promote and foster personal accountability among the judges.
Given the popular usage of the terms "judicial independence" and "judicial
accountability" in such widely varying ways-most notably to refer to the more
67Some would argue that by defining judicial accountability to mean the same
thing as "integrity." See supra Part C.2.ii and infra Part E.2. I have defined the
conflict away. There is no doubt that structural accountability still conflicts with
concepts of independence, and that I have substituted the concept of internal
accountability for external accountability. But the point remains that structural
accountability is of secondary importance, as a poor surrogate for the more vital
issue for the judiciary, which is the personal accountability of the judge. And for
that, there is no conflict.
68See supra Part B.2.
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objectively observable, structural mechanisms-it will be useful for this discussion
to define new terms. The concept of subjective judicial independence-the
willingness of the judge to defy external forces and consequences and assert personal
independence-might be more descriptively referred to as "judicial courage." By
the same token, the concept of a judge's subjective accountability to the law and
higher principles-personal accountability-might be more meaningfully described
as "judicial integrity." These terms help focus attention on the subjective, internal,
and ultimately far more important determinants of our "end" objectives.
A. Judicial Courage
As explained above, the most direct and compelling determinant of judicial
independence is not the degree of structural protection the judge may enjoy, but
rather the degree ofjudicial courage the judge has or demonstrates in her work. It is
this courage that enables the judge to withstand pressures and influences, even
threats, and exercise true independence in her decision-making. If we want a truly
independent judiciary, it is essential that we have judges who demonstrate this
courage.
Judicial courage is an essential attribute for judges no matter how much structural
protection they may enjoy. Indeed, the system can never insulate judges completely
from backlash or pressure. Federal District Judge Harold Baer in New York was a
lightening rod for public denouncement after his controversial ruling suppressing
evidence in a highly publicized drug case.69 Specifically, Judge Baer suppressed
almost eighty pounds of cocaine and heroin that had been seized by police, as well as
the videotaped confession of the drug courier, as fruit of the illegal seizure, stating
that the suspects fleeing from a car when approached by police did not give those
police probable cause to search the car. Particularly controversial was the language
in the judge's decision that highly publicized police corruption in that New York
neighborhood made it reasonable, not suspicious, for people to flee when police
officers approach.7" This set off a firestorm of public denunciations of both the
decision and the judge, led by public commentators and public officials right up to
the White House.7
69See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y 1996), vacated on
reconsideration, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 201 F.3d 116 (2d Cir.
2000).
7 Id. at 242.
71The denunciations by high-level public officials are summarized at John Q.
Barrett, Introduction: The Voices and Groups that Will Preserve (What We Can
Preserve ol) Judicial Independence, 12 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1, 2 n.4
(1996):
Government officials led the criticism of Judge Baer. New York Governor George
Pataki stated that "[t]he judge's decision is despicable." New York Suspect May Walk
Away From Drug Arrest (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 26, 1996). New York City
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, who had been Baer's colleague when each was an Assistant
United States Attorney in the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District
of New York, said the Judge's ruling was "mind-boggling in its effect," and that the
decision was "very, very troubling and very, very disturbing." Clifford Krauss,
Giuliani and Bratton Assail U.S. Judge's Ruling in Drug Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27,
1996, § 1, at 25. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) recommended that Judge
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As a life-tenured judge, removable only by impeachment, it is highly unlikely
that Judge Baer ever could have been disciplined or removed for this most unpopular
decision.72  Indeed, the structural protections afforded federal judges are widely
recognized as the most robust anywhere in the world. But he and his family
certainly suffered terribly from the nationwide opprobrium heaped upon him. While
one should be reluctant to interpret his later reconsideration and reversal of the
unpopular ruling as capitulation to the pressure he must have felt, there is a
possibility that such pressure may have played a role in his ultimate disposition of
that issue and that case. Many perceived it so.73 The perceptions themselves, true or
not, do tremendous violence to public confidence in the independence of the
judiciary.74 And if those perceptions are correct, this presents a compelling example
Baer be sentenced to live one year in Washington Heights, to see if he would run away
when he saw police, see A.M. Rosenthal, Contempt in Court, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30,
1996, at A15. New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton called Judge
Baer's decision "absolutely crazy" and stated that Baer is "living in a fairyland." Paul
Moses & Joseph W. Queen, Judge: Men Not Wrong to Run From Cops, Newsday,
Jan. 26, 1996, at A3. New York State Attorney General Dennis Vacco said that judges
"should not be handcuffing our cops with arcane technicalities." Greg Smith & Frank
Lombardi, Rudy, Gov. Hit Judge For Axing Drug Case, N.Y. Daily News, Jan. 26,
1996, at 4. Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole (R-KS) blasted judges who "believe[ ]
that police officers are a bigger threat to the well-being of our communities than those
who peddle drugs to our kids." 142 Cong. Rec. S539 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Dole). Senator Orin Hatch (R-UT) called Baer a "bleeding-heart
judge" who "lacks common sense and judgment." Gov't Press Release, Feb. 9, 1996.
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-GA) called Judge Baer a "pro-drug dealer,
pro-crime" judge. Lawmakers Call for Resignation of Judge, U.P.I., March 6, 1996.
Rep. Fred Upton (R-MI) stated that Judge Baer is "a Monopoly game gone bad,...
handing out 'get-out-of-jail' free cards with reckless abandon." Id. White House Press
Secretary Michael McCurry, speaking on behalf of President Clinton, stated that Judge
Baer "made a bad decision." White House Regular Daily Briefing; Trading Symbols,
F.D.C.H. Political Transcripts, March 21, 1996.
Newspaper columnists and editorial writers also were scathing in their criticism of
Judge Baer's ruling. See, e.g., The Drug Judge, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1996, at A10
("Winning the war on drugs won't be easy if the battles end up in courtrooms like
that of Harold Baer"); Judge Baer Mocks Justice, N.Y. Daily News, Jan. 26, 1996,
at 38 ("Federal Judge Harold Baer has become an accomplice to evil"); A.M.
Rosenthal, supra ("some judges use their social and political inclinations, ego,
antagonisms and biases to shape their decisions").
72Although several members of Congress talked about impeachment possibilities
for Judge Baer in the wake of his decision, id. at 3 n.6, nothing ever came of it.
73See, e.g., Joyce Price & Warren Strobel, Judge Bows to Critics, Reverses Drug
Ruling, WASH. TIMES, April 2, 1996, at Al; see also American Judicature Society,
Political Threats to Judicial Independence, http://www.ajs.org/
cjilcji_politicalthreats.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2008) ("The fact that Judge Baer
reversed his previous ruling is cause for concern about the implications for judicial
independence.").
74 See id. U.S. District (now Chief) Judge for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Alex Kozinski said:
What worries me is that the comments made by members of the political branches
might have made it difficult for Judge Baer to change his mind without looking like he
was caving in. Essentially, it put him in a position that whatever he did-stay put,
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of a less-than-fully independent judiciary and, notably, one that is not the function of
poor structural protections for judges. If the judges bow to pressure in such
circumstances, compromising judicial independence, the weakness that precipitates
the compromise is not one of structural protection, but of judicial courage.
The point here is that judicial courage is necessary, even where strong structural
protections are in place. The existence of good protections for judges, such as
Article III judges enjoy in our federal system, is neither a substitute for nor a source
ofjudicial courage.
There are many remarkable examples of judicial courage where judges withstood
remarkable pressures and did "the right thing" anyway. Some of these judges
suffered serious repercussions as a result.75 The most obvious examples come from
the judges who handed down desegregation decisions in the South in the 1950s and
1960s. Professor Susan Estrich tells a story of Judge J. Skelly Wright, then a federal
district court judge in Louisiana, had been the victim of public backlash so many
times, he instructed the U.S. Marshals' security detail watching his home not to even
call him unless the crosses burning in his yard were too close to the house, putting
the house itself at risk of fire.76 These are our heroes of judicial courage, our
champions ofjudicial independence.77
B. Judicial Integrity
Judicial courage however, standing alone, is not necessarily a virtue. Judicial
courage may just as easily embolden a judge to do the wrong thing, the self-
interested thing, the politically motivated thing." Judicial courage becomes a virtue
only when it is coupled with judicial integrity, which we may characterize as a
rehear the case, change his mind outright or recuse himself-he might be accused of
yielding to political pressure.
75The judges involved in the Terry Schiavo case were not subject to discipline or
removal due to their unpopular rulings, but they were vilified in public and in the
press nonetheless. Geyh, supra note 16, at 912.
76Professor Susan Estrich, University of Southern California Gould School of
Law, Address at the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting:
Judicial Independence and Political Accountability (Jan. 5, 2008). A particularly
compelling account of the harassment Judge Wright's family suffered in that period
can be found in Liva Baker, THE SECOND BAITTLE OF NEW ORLEANS: THE HUNDRED-
YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE THE SCHOOLS 423-26 (Harper Collins 1996). It is
noteworthy that when Judge Wright was elevated to the Court of Appeals, he could
not be put on a court in the South, where his decisions had made him so unpopular,
but instead was named to the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 462-66.
77Jack Bass, Tribute to John Minor Wisdom: John Minor Wisdom and the
Impact of Law, 69 Miss. L.J. 25, 26-29 (1999). See generally David E. Bernstein &
Ilya Somin, Judicial Power and Civil Rights Reconsidered, 114 YALE L.J. 591
(2004) (reviewing MICHEAL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004)).
78See discussion supra Part D. A judge insulated from repercussions for her
decisions is not only free to do the right thing, but free to do the wrong thing. Even
more compelling, the judge who exhibits great judicial courage may assert that
courage to pursue either lofty principles of justice or, no less, a pattern of corrupt
behavior.
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commitment to the highest principles of judicial decision-making. Judicial integrity
is essentially synonymous with personal or subjective judicial accountability as
defined earlier in this Article,7 9 but the term is more evocative of the underlying
concept.
The threat of judicial discipline-structural judicial accountability-is not a
source for judicial integrity, and it is indeed a poor means of inspiring judges to do
the right thing. Judicial integrity, like judicial courage, is better viewed as something
that "comes from within," reflecting the individual's grounding in moral principles
and commitment to the rule of law. As used in this Article, "judicial integrity" is
that quality that enables her to recognize the "right" thing to do in her decision," and
the predisposition to do that right thing.8'
Professor Burbank implicitly argues that this judicial integrity-to which he
attaches the less precise label of "judicial accountability"--is vital to preserving
judicial independence. He notes that unless judges demonstrate this type of integrity,
the other branches of government and the public will not have sufficient confidence
or trust in the judiciary to allow them unfettered independence. It is when judges fail
to exercise such integrity that outside forces (other branches of government, or even
the public) feel the need to intervene, to weaken the judges' structural protections,
and even to threaten them with repercussions.82
But judicial discipline structures are a poor fix for a judge who lacks judicial
integrity. It is far too difficult to distinguish an entirely appropriate, but unpopular,
judicial decision from one that abuses authority or is driven by improper motives.
An aggressive disciplinary regime may have negative repercussions on a judge who
is doing the right thing; a more cautious regime will allow abuses to go unchecked.
And all the minor, invisible, and unprovable offenses of judges who lack judicial
integrity are unreachable in any case.
79At best, the term "judicial accountability" is cumbersome in this context. At
worst, it can be misleading, as it may shift focus to structural accountability: the
potential to discipline or "rein in" judges who are out of line. Hence, the term
"judicial integrity" is a more descriptive term.
80Of course, the concept of integrity does not require that there always be one
unique "right thing" in any given case. See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 47. It is
common for judges of the highest integrity, sitting on the same case, to reach
different conclusions, dissenting from each other's opinions.
81While we are using the term "integrity" to avoid potential confusion between
structural accountability and personal accountability (as previously defined), the use
of the word "integrity" could be misleading in another way. Some definitions of
"integrity" incorporate an element of courage as well. Dictionary definitions may
refer to integrity as "uncompromised adherence" to ethical principles. RANDOM
HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 700 (1991). This may suggest not only
the recognition of what is right and the predisposition to do the right thing, but also
the courage to do so in the face of pressure or other adverse consequences. For
purposes of this Article, however, we will define the term "integrity" as the mere
recognition of and predisposition toward the right thing. Courage works hand in
hand with integrity as mutually reinforcing concepts, of course, as explained supra
Part D.
82See generally Geyh, supra note 16; Burbank, supra note 19.
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VI. DETERMINANTS OF JUDICIAL COURAGE AND INTEGRITY
So given that our policy objective-"a judicial system that affords due process to
all parties, impartially and according to law"--is a function of these two elements,
judicial integrity and judicial courage, we must consider what the determinants are of
such integrity and courage. The answer is not entirely obvious and deserves
considerable attention, more than can be afforded in this Article.
A. The Innate Qualities of Judicial Appointees
As already suggested, these qualities-judicial integrity and judicial courage-to
a large degree, are likely to reflect the innate qualities of the persons appointed to the
bench: their values and personalities. In other words, judicial integrity and courage
may be simply elements of a judge's character, drawn from the inside, perhaps
cultivated over the years,' and not so much the product of external laws, structures,
or forces that come into play after they are appointed to the bench, as suggested by
the typical "independence v. accountability" debate.
To the extent that is true, the most critical decision-point is the initial selection of
judges." Judicial selection criteria and processes may or may not be well-crafted to
find and install as judges those individuals who demonstrate the qualities of judicial
courage and judicial integrity. Senate confirmation hearings-as applies to Article
III judges in the federal judiciary-could probe for these values, but only if the
Senators, and those who advise them, choose to focus on such attributes.
How judges should be selected to increase the likelihood that they will
demonstrate these qualities on the bench is beyond the scope of this Article, but
certainly worthy of further analysis. It is sufficient to note here that if we want to
preserve judicial independence-or, more precisely, a system that affords due
process to all parties, impartially and according to lqw-our judicial screening and
selection criteria should weight these characteristics heavily.86
83See Zemans, supra note 18.
84This conclusion could be asserted as a self-evident truth, but it could be
enlightening to examine or conduct psychological research to ascertain the sources
of an individual's courage and integrity and what factors may cultivate those
attributes in our judges. For purposes of this Article, a judge's endowment of
courage and integrity are assumed-as a product of their innate qualities and of their
cultural norms-with attention focused on the impact of judicial structure on the
exercise of those attributes.
85 Following this line of thought, perhaps those concerned about promoting
judicial independence should be paying far more attention to the judicial screening
and selection process than to the "independence v. accountability" debate. To a
large degree, the best thing we can do to preserve a system that affords due process
to all parties, impartially and according to law is to appoint the right judges in the
first place.
860f course, in the post-Bork era, bold and courageous individuals are less likely
to get nominated in the first place, as anyone who has generated controversy is
considered an easy target in the confirmation process. One might well argue that the
federal judicial selection process is now skewed heavily in favor of judges whose
careers have been unremarkable, without accomplishments that could have
generated note or controversy. This seems unlikely to be the pool of the most
courageous judicial candidates.
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B. Cultural Norms: Informal and Formal Customs and Expectations
Professor Burbank has suggested that societal norms, customs, and expectations
are among the most compelling determinants of the American "tradition of judicial
independence."8 7 That tradition undoubtedly inspires much of the judicial integrity
and judicial courage we see exercised in the American judiciary today.
But cultural norms, by definition, vary with the culture. Since the end of the
Cold War, there has been a tremendous push to promote international judicial
exchange and dialogue between jurists from both East and West. It has become
almost routine for delegations of foreign judges to come to the United States on
"study tours" to observe the U.S. justice system in action, to meet with American
judges, and to learn what they can about the American judiciary that may be worthy
of emulation in their own systems back home. Almost without exception, the
Eastern Europeans express admiration for the degree of funding, dignity, and
independence enjoyed by the judges in the American courts, as well as regret that it
could never be replicated in their own systems.88
Why not? Mostly because there is no cultural tradition or norm in these societies
to give their courts the kind of deference accorded the judges and judiciaries of the
United States.89 Often, the legislatures will not (or cannot) fund the third branch
sufficiently; the Executive Branch may manipulate or disregard judicial decisions;
and the public-after decades of judicial manipulation by the "Party"-are unlikely
to respect the judges or their decisions.9"
Of course, public confidence in the judiciary is very much a function of the
customs, norms, and traditions that it associates with the judicial function. But no
less important is the fact that judges aspire to high integrity because they live and
work in a culture that prizes it. Indeed, the greatest heroes of the American
judiciary, and for that matter of American legal history, are the maverick judges who
stood up and did the right thing in the face of overwhelming political and personal
pressure to do otherwise.9 In the American legal culture, almost every judge-on
87Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and
Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 909, 913 (2007) (". . . the work of Charles
Geyh, has thus made it clear that the traditional equilibrium between the federal
judiciary and the other branches-what the organizers of this Conference have
called 'our nation's tradition of judicial independence'-owes its existence
primarily to informal norms and customs.").
88Interview with Jeffrey Barr, Attorney-Advisor, Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, in Washington, D.C. (June 27, 2007).
89See generally Pimentel, supra note 3 (discussing the efforts made to reform the
"culture of low expectations" that prevailed in the pre-war Bosnian judiciary).
9
°See Zemans, supra note 22, at 626 ("[A] grant of authority has depended on
the perceived legitimacy of the courts and their role in our system of government.").
91See the example of J. Skelly Wright, supra note 76, just one of many
courageous judges who oversaw desegregation of schools after Brown v. Board of
Education. Of course, sometimes it takes time for history to determine whether the
courageous decision was a good one. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's 1854 bold
and courageous decision on the Fugitive Slave Law is sometimes cited as an
example of courage to do the right thing, particularly now that history has vindicated
the anti-slavery cause served by that decision. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854). Many
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some level--dreams of being that hero, who demonstrates both the integrity to make
the right decision and the courage to withstand the pressure to do otherwise.
We should be careful not to take these customs, norms, and traditions for granted.
Just as judicial reform efforts in Eastern Europe are striving to cultivate a culture that
respects the independence and dignity of the judiciary, our own culture is also
evolving, and some have warned that the American traditions of independence for
the judiciary are vulnerable.92 Expectations and cultural norms, though easily
overlooked or undervalued, may go further in explaining how a judiciary achieves
true independence and accountability than any other factor.
C. Structural Factors: The Balance of Structural Protections v. Discipline
Mechanisms
It is in the exercise of judicial independence that the conventional debate over
"independence and accountability"-i.e. striking the right balance in the structural
forms-has its true relevance. The issue is not balancing independence against
accountability per se, but balancing the structural components of the judiciary in the
manner most likely to cultivate appropriate exercises of both judicial courage and
integrity.
The existence of structural protections to support judicial independence, while
not the source of judicial courage, can enhance a judge's exercise of such courage.
They can leverage what courage is already there and amplify its impact by
emboldening a judge who otherwise might waver at the moment of truth.
93
Similarly, the existence of a system of judicial discipline does not generate integrity.
Rather it is an environmental factor that may influence a judge in her exercise of
integrity, i.e. it may mitigate the harm when integrity is lacking, primarily by giving
the judge other reasons to do the right thing or to avoid the wrong thing.
In addition, structural independence and accountability can help foster the
development of a culture of courage and integrity among judges. The mere existence
of these structures can inspire confidence in the judicial system, both within it and
outside it, quite separate from the structures' practical impact and operation. These
judges have exercised courage to hand down bold and controversial decisions, only
to have history condemn them for picking the wrong side. See, e.g., Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
92
8ee, e.g., Burbank, supra note 87, at 913.
[W]e know that customs, norms, and traditions can change. Neither the fact that
periods of friction between the judiciary and the other branches have recurred
throughout our history nor the fact that they have been succeeded by a return to
normalcy is adequate grounds for confidence that the pattern will hold. Similarly,
optimism that norms of interdependence between the Executive and Legislative
branches can be restored provides little comfort. For, if I am correct about the
dynamics leading to our current malaise, there is reason to fear a tipping point, a point
of no return to the traditional equilibrium in interbranch relations affecting the
judiciary.
Id.
93Structural safeguards for judicial independence may be justified on other
grounds, not that it is necessary to compensate for the judges' tepid courage, or that
judges would not do the right thing without such protections, but that it is inherently
unfair for us to ask and expect judges to take those risks and make those sacrifices.
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are symbols, and while it is difficult to assess the impact of symbols, it is foolish to
underestimate them.
The upshot is that the "accountability v. independence" debate is further removed
from the ultimate policy objective than we normally think. Because the "end" we
seek-a system that affords due process to all parties, impartially and according to
law-is a function of judicial integrity and courage, we should focus on how to build
and shore up those principles among our judges. Accountability mechanisms and
structural safeguards of judicial independence are only two of a variety of factors
that might influence judges' integrity or their courage to act on it. To strike the right
balance for any particular system or society-and we do, after all, have to decide
how much structural independence and accountability to build into the system-we
need to evaluate separately the impact of these two factors on judges' integrity and
courage.
VII. GRAPHING THE PROBLEM
The multiple dimensions of this issue can be illustrated on a simple graph,
depicting judicial integrity on the vertical axis and judicial courage on the horizontal
axis. Every judge or judicial candidate/nominee has some endowment of judicial
integrity and a second one of judicial courage, allowing her to be plotted at a unique
spot on the graph. The graph can then be subdivided into four quadrants, those on
the right including judges of high courage, and those on the top including judges of
high integrity.
High





Low Judicial Courage High
Fig. 1 - Plotting Judicial Integrity Against Judicial Courage
More specifically, in the Northeast quadrant (Quadrant A), we find the juddges of
the highest integrity and the highest courage. These are our "heroes." In the
Northwest quadrant (Quadrant B), we find judges who want to do the right thing, but
are vulnerable to outside threats and pressures; their integrity is high, but their
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courage is lacking.94 Quadrant C, in the Southwest, includes the "corruptible"
judges, whose integrity is dubious, and who, lacking courage, are susceptible to
pressure. Here is where you might find judges who pander to the whims of the
executive branch or who are even in the pocket of the mob. They are not bent on
pursuing their own corrupt agenda (see Quadrant D, infra) as they lack the courage
for such an enterprise, but are manipulable, and may well end up doing the bidding
of others. In the Southeast (Quadrant D) we find the scariest of all, the judges with
low integrity and ample courage; these are what Judge Noonan described as








grity C I D
Corruptible Monsters
Low
Low Judicial Courage High
Fig. 2 - Categorizing Judicial Types by Quadrant
In setting forth this taxonomy of judges, there is no intent to insult the judges
presently on the bench in the American judiciary or any other judiciary. The four
quadrants posited here should not be interpreted as a suggestion that a quarter of our
judges, or any presently sitting for that matter, are "monsters." On the other hand,
this taxonomy is not completely hypothetical. Judge Noonan has documented the
existence of monsters on the bench in history; it is certainly possible that this may
94While it may be hard to know how many judges fall into this quadrant,
literature is full of tragic characters who know what is right and want to do what is
right, but who succumb to pressure. They have not lost their moral compass-
indeed they are tortured by their ethical lapses-but at the critical moment they
lacked the courage to do the right thing. Two that come to mind quickly are Joseph
Conrad's Lord Jim, and Lt. Col. Markinson in Aaron Sorkin's play (and Rob
Reiner's film) A Few Good Men. JOSEPH CONRAD, LORD JIM (1900); AARON
SORKIN, A FEW GOOD MEN (1989); A FEW GOOD MEN (Columbia Pictures 1992).
95
THE RESPONSIBLE JUDGE: READINGS IN JUDICIAL ETHICS 35-47 (John T.
Noonan, Jr. & Kenneth I. Winston eds., 1993).
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happen again. Accordingly, the proffered taxonomy is offered as an analytical rubric
to help us understand the proper role of structural protections and disciplinary
regimes in producing/supporting a judicial system that affords due process to all
parties, impartially and according to law.
A. Impact of Judicial Discipline (Accountability) Regimes
Using the graphical depiction, we can see that the imposition of a disciplinary
regime is not going to move judges from Quadrant D upward to Quadrant A.
Monsters will not acquire integrity through the threat of discipline. Their courage
numbs them to such influences-they are unlikely to be swayed by fear. Rather, the
disciplinary regime will have its greatest impact on the left side of the graph, where
judges are susceptible to outside pressures. For these judges the threat of discipline
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Fig. 3 - The impact of a judicial discipline regime
B. Impact of Structural Protections for Judges
At the same time, structural protections will bolster the exercise of judicial
courage, nudging judges to the right, wherever they may start on the graph. Those in
Quadrant B will be pushed toward Quadrant A, a positive development, when
additional protections are provided to judges to strengthen their position and insulate
them from outside threats and pressures. This is the dynamic that prompts reformers
to call for greater protections, to support the ideal of greater judicial independence.
In most courts of the United States, and for most sitting judges, this is indeed a
desirable goal.
At the same time, however, the strengthening of judges' structural protections
may push judges from Quadrant C toward Quadrant D, turning them into monsters.
If the judges already lack integrity, new protections may embolden them, convincing
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Fig. 4 - Impact of strengthened structural protections for judges
VIII. INTERPRETING THE GRAPH TO ARRIVE AT THE "RIGHT BALANCE"
When it comes to "finding the right balance" in terms of structural features,
therefore, the answer depends on where the judicial system sits on the chart, i.e. in
which quadrant we find most of the judges, where the most significant cluster of
plots lies.96
If judges are concentrated in Quadrant C, then the beefing up of judicial
accountability mechanisms is warranted. These judges are vulnerable to pressure;
we need to make sure that whatever pressure they feel nudges them up toward
Quadrant B, where they are exercising greater integrity. Absence of such positive
pressure may leave them subject to political pressures and worse.
If the judges are, for the most part, in Quadrants B and A, they are already
showing integrity, and should be strengthened in that position. It is in these
situations that it makes the most sense to install or upgrade structural protections
(such as life-tenure, security, etc.). Those in Quadrant B can be nudged to the right
toward Quadrant A, as such protections embolden them to exercise courage to act on
their already-ethical instincts.
If, in contrast, a judiciary has a concentration of judges in Quadrant D, the
appropriate balance may involve removing some structural protections. A judicial
system full of monsters needs the power to "clean house": to, at the very least, send a
strong message that bad judges risk consequences if they continue to pursue a pattern
9See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 19, at 324 (observing that there is no one-size-
fits-all in finding the right balance ofjudicial independence).
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of corruption. The removal or weakening of structural protections may nudge judges
from Quadrant D toward Quadrant C; it will make them more vulnerable and
therefore more susceptible to the threat of discipline. For true monsters, one would
hope for a sufficient weakening of structural protections to permit their removal from
the system altogether-by impeachment, recall/retention elections, disciplinary
removal, or whatever-as the influence of structural adjustments is unlikely to ever
get them to Quadrant A.97
Overall, the pattern of reform can be depicted primarily as a clockwise motion on
the graph. But the structural approaches must be flexible enough to respond to the
current state of the judiciary and the attributes of the majority of the judges in that
system. Structural protections must be relaxed enough to clear judges out of
Quadrant D, and then disciplinary regimes can be imposed to nudge judges
northward, from Quadrant C to Quadrant B, where they are showing more integrity.
By the time the judges are mostly concentrated in the top half of the graph,
strengthened structural protections are warranted to nudge judges eastward,
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Fig. 5 - The trajectory of judicial reform
The upshot is that there is no one right "balance"--no one-size-fits-all solution-
to be struck between judicial independence and judicial accountability. The
individual qualities of the judges, and the culture of the judiciary-including
97Consider, for example, the challenge faced by court reformers in Bosnia, who
felt it necessary to conduct a clean sweep of the Bosnian judiciary. See Pimentel,
supra note 3, at I 1-13 (discussing the efforts made to reform the "culture of low
expectations" that prevailed in the pre-war Bosnian judiciary). While these judges
certainly were not all monsters-indeed, more than half of them were appointed to
new posts afterward-there was a sufficient prevalence of weak and corrupt judges
to warrant complete suspension of structural protections. Id.
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traditions, norms, and expectations-will dictate where the balance should be struck
in any given place and time. And the pattern of reform may well require a sequence,
on appropriate intervals, of structural changes to bring the judges to where they can
be effective-demonstrating both the courage and the integrity necessary to sustain
the Rule of Law.
Application in International Judicial Reform
In the United States, although we enjoy strong cultural norms for a robust and
ethical judiciary,98 we should not expect to find identical situations in the federal and
various state judiciaries. Even less analogous would be the prevailing standards of
independence and accountability in other countries. As already noted, many foreign
judiciaries may covet the independence that prevails in the American judiciary, but it
does not follow that if a structure like ours is adopted elsewhere, the foreign
judiciary will acquire the attributes of the American system. For this reason, as
suggested at the outset of this article, the American judicial system may be a poor
blueprint for international judicial reform efforts.
The graphics set forth above illustrate the point clearly. While in the United
States we may find most judges in Quadrant A or perhaps B, we can justify a regime
of strong structural protections for incumbent judges. Such a regime strengthens and
comforts the courageous, and builds courage among those who are ethical but timid.
A dysfunctional court in a less-developed nation, or particularly one that never had a
truly independent judiciary, however, may have no tradition of judicial integrity.
Replicating American concepts of structural protection, therefore, may exacerbate
problems in that country as the monsters in Quadrant D are made untouchable, and
as the weak and corruptible judges in Quadrant C are assured that they may pursue
their corrupt agenda without fear of consequences.
The challenge in international judicial reform, therefore, then becomes one of
cultivating a culture of a strong, ethical, and independent judiciary. As new cultural
norms are established, the ideal balance-the policy balance struck between
structural independence and structural accountability-may shift. In any case,
whatever balance is right for a particular society now, that will not necessarily be the
right balance in another place today, or in the same place tomorrow.
IX. CONCLUSION
Improvements in judicial performance, occasioned by structural adjustments to
the protections and discipline accorded the judges and the judicial branch as a whole,
will come only as a slow, evolving response to such adjustments. As New Jersey
Supreme Court Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt said over a century ago, "[J]udicial
reform is no sport for the short-winded."99 But despite the patience required, the
questions and issues are absolutely fundamental to establishing and maintaining the
Rule of Law.
With that in mind, it is essential that we have a clear idea of what our goal is and
how best to get there. The simplistic characterization of the issue as one of
balancing two worthy interests against each other-judicial independence v. judicial
98See supra Part F.2.
99Chem. Separation Tech. Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 771, 817-18 (2002)
(quoting MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION xix (Arthur T.
Vanderbilt ed., 1949)).
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accountability-has framed the discussion of these issues in the past. But this
oversimplified approach neglects the fundamental importance of the judges'
individual endowments of judicial courage and judicial integrity as well as the
culture in which they are exercised. To appreciate how we achieve an independent
and accountable judiciary, we need to examine how the structural elements--(l)
insulating judges from outside influence and (2) subjecting them to appropriate
discipline-influence judges in their exercise of courage and integrity. Our ultimate
goal, to produce a judicial system that affords due process to all parties, impartially
and according to law, 00 will be best served by adopting a judicial structure that
leverages these judicial attributes to maximum effect.
Because the prevailing cultural norms may differ and may change, and because
the individual judges may exhibit varying degrees of courage and integrity, any
search for one "ideal" balance between structural independence and accountability is
misguided. A more culture-specific, court-specific and, in extreme cases even judge-
specific analysis-focusing on judges' courage and integrity-is far more likely to
yield effective policy prescriptions for judicial reform, both at home and abroad.
100See supra Part B.2.
